Swarthmore College

Works
History Faculty Works

History

2000

Austrian Non-Reception Of A Reluctant Goldhagen
Pieter M. Judson , '78
Swarthmore College, pjudson1@swarthmore.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-history
Part of the History Commons

Let us know how access to these works benefits you

Recommended Citation
Pieter M. Judson , '78. (2000). "Austrian Non-Reception Of A Reluctant Goldhagen". The "Goldhagen
Effect": History, Memory, Nazism: Facing The German past. 131-149.
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-history/177

This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
History Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact
myworks@swarthmore.edu.

Austrian Non-Reception of a
Reluctant Goldhagen
Pieter Judson

German translations of Hitler’s Willing Executioners appeared in Austria
in September of 1996 to a strangely distanced reception. The book did not
unleash in Austria the kind of public discussion it called forth in neigh
boring Germany. The book did not even sell particularly well. Most Aus
trian reviewers treated it with an exaggerated deference, praising the work
for what they called its original focus on the participation of ordinary
Germans in the Holocaust. Some went so far as to remind their readers
that what Goldhagen had written about the Germans could be said of
“Austrian citizens of the German Reich” or “citizens of Greater Ger
many” (Grossdeutschland) as well.' While Austrian reviewers acknowl
edged that the book’s more controversial conclusions had drawn strong
criticism in American and German scholarly circles, they seemed to have
missed the more interesting phenomenon altogether, namely, the degree of
Goldhagen’s personal popularity in Germany. Instead, reviewers tended
to describe the Goldhagen phenomenon purely as an academic contro
versy over narrow issues of interpretation.
The bloodless reception in Hitler’s homeland of a book that charac
terized ordinary German attitudes toward Jews as eliminationist and doc
umented the active complicity of ordinary Germans in the Holocaust
might seem surprising. After all, public opinion polls of the past decade
have consistently registered lingering Austrian bitterness over the Wald
heim controversy and a defensive anger directed toward “world Jewry.”
Did no Austrians reject Goldhagen’s accusations as constituting yet
I would like to thank Matt! Bunzl, Heidemarie Uhl, and Douglas McKeown for their
insightful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
1. Hans Rauscher, “Ganz gewohnliche Deutsche,” Kurier, 17 August 1996, 3; Arbeitskreis Goldhagen, Goldhagen und Osterreich: Ganz gewohnliche Osterreicherinnen und ein
Holocaust-Buch (Vienna, 1998), 8.
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another smear campaign? More to the point, given the reasons for the
book’s popularity in Germany, did not those Austrians seeking to undo
the myth of Austrian victim status find it a useful confirmation of their
arguments? Or did this nonreaction simply confirm the popular view
among American, European, and some Austrian observers that Austrians
stubbornly deny their perpetrator past? This latter was, for example, the
conclusion reached by the Arbeitskreis Goldhagen, a group of left-wing
university students who published the volume Goldhagen und Osterreich in
the summer of 1998.^
Whatever else it implied, I do not believe that the bland reception
Goldhagen received at the hands of the Austrians simply reflected an
ongoing denial of Austrians’ historic participation in the Holocaust. The
question of how to treat Austria’s Nazi and antisemitic pasts is in fact cen
tral to public discourse in today’s Austria. The question underlies several
current controversies, both within the academic community and generally
in the public sphere. It permeates almost every new attempt by each of the
political parties to reposition itself with particular voting groups. In a
sense, the question cannot be escaped. We might find fault with the ways
in which the question is debated, with its particular manipulations at the
hands of historians, politicians, and journalists, but the general consensus
that Austria was Hitler’s first victim no longer holds sway.
There is, therefore, some point in seeking to understand why Austri
ans did not react to Hitler’s Willing Executioners. In a society where claims
and counterclaims about the Holocaust, about Austrians’ relationship to
the Third Reich, and about the nature of Austrian identity are today more
bound together than ever before, it may be useful to investigate the rea
sons why, in this case, the proverbial dog did not bark. In what follows I
will argue that two contingencies—(1) the particular demands of Austrian
politics in the fall of 1996, and (2) the nature of Goldhagen’s argumenta
tion itself—ensured that Hitler’s Willing Executioners made few waves in
Austria, even as it became a topic of almost obsessional proportion in
neighboring Germany.
Austrian History, Austrian Identity

The new Austrian identity pieced together after the collapse of the Third
Reich built on several political elements of the imperial and republican
pasts, while strongly rejecting the German ethnic basis for national iden
tity that had defined its predecessor. The first Austrian Republic had
defined itself literally as the republic of German Austrians (the term Aus2. Goldhagen und Osterreich, 7.
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tria had theretofore included people of several national and ethnic
identifications). Most citizens of the new state viewed potential Anschluss
with Germany as their economic and cultural salvation, at least until 1933.
After Austria achieved full independence in 1955, however, political lead
ers of Austria’s two major parties, the Socialist Democrats (SPO) and the
Catholic Peoples’ Party (OVP) tended to define Austria’s unique mission,
and thus its identity in a Cold War world, according to its geographic sit
uation between east and west, and its political neutrality.
This new identity ignored the paramount issue of Austria’s interwar
history, namely, Anschluss with Germany. It therefore fostered a kind of
amnesia toward Austria’s recent past, since it required a thorough denial
of the powerful German nationalist traditions of the preceding fifty years.
Austrian leaders were aided, of course, by the Allied declaration of
November 1943 that proclaimed Austria Hitler’s first victim, and by the
Allied tendency to equate Prussian German traditions with the cultural
origins of Nazism. This official rejection of the recent past for a completely
new identity meant that in the public sphere, at least, the recent past would
remain largely unexamined.
Amnesia about its recent past, however, did not require a denial of all
Austrian history. On the contrary, evocations of Austria’s imperial past
have recently become a critical ingredient in the global popularization of
Vienna as a center for tourism and high culture. It was also a critical ingre
dient in Austria’s chosen identity as mediator between west and east, or
between the developed and third worlds. Until the fall of neighboring
communist regimes in 1989, Austrians often drew on a nostalgic vision of
their imperial multinational. Catholic internationalist past to differentiate
themselves from Germans and to construct a relevant mediating role for
themselves in the Cold War era. The visible presence of Slovene, Czech,
and Hungarian flags waving at Empress Zita’s funeral in 1989, for ex
ample, was but a small reminder of Austria’s historic relationship to those
“nations,” a relationship the latter now view far more positively than they
did before fifty years of Soviet hegemony.^
3. In 1989 it was decided that a state funeral would be held in Vienna for the recently
deceased Empress Zita, wife of the last Habsburg emperor Charles. Imperial tradition dic
tated the route to be taken by the cortege through the streets of the inner city to the
Capuziner Crypt, final resting place of the Habsburgs. More than one commentator noted
that the imperial cortege would have to circle the Albertinaplatz, site of Alfred Hrdlicka’s
recently erected monument to the victims of fascism. Should the coffin of the Empress (a
reminder of a glorious tradition) be confronted with this brutal monument to Austria’s recent
past? Some wondered whether the route might not be changed to avoid the monument’s bru
tal evocation of Jews forced to clean Vienna’s streets during the Anschluss. The funeral, after
all, was an attempt to recreate an imperial past that would evoke contemporary Austria’s
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When Austrians evoke the imperial past, it is, of course, an extremely
selective process. Along with historicist architectural reminders of
Vienna’s centrality in East Central Europe, the city also houses visible
monuments to more unsettling by-products of that very same age. Several
monuments, for example, recall the rise of political, cultural, and religious
antisemitism in Vienna. Even the most innocent of tourists can’t fail to
notice the ongoing popularity of Karl Lueger, Vienna’s greatest mayor
(1897-1911) and founder of the populist antisemitic Christian Social
movement in Austria. Several monuments, a church, and a segment of the
Ringstrasse testify to Lueger’s gargantuan importance in Vienna’s con
struction of its past and present identity. Today’s OVP situates itself con
sciously as the postwar legatee of Lueger’s Christian Social party.
Historians, both Austrian and American, have themselves given
Lueger the necessary alibi to remain a respected and beloved figure in Aus
trian mythology, for his political use of antisemitism was above all consid
ered opportunist and not ideological, situational and not racialist.
Lueger’s was the cultural antisemitism of the ordinary person, not at all
the virulently racist, ideological ravings of an Adolf Hitler or a Georg von
Schonerer. This distinction parallels another important element in post1945 Austrian public culture that makes it difficult to square today’s Aus
trian identity with the histories of individual Austrians. Immediately after
the war, politicians on all sides strongly condemned antisemitism but care
fully defined it as the ideologically racialist view held by the Nazis. Their
narrow focus on Nazi antisemitism enabled cultural, private, or religious
antisemitic prejudice in Austria to survive largely unexamined. The latter
forms of antisemitic prejudice became unlinked from the public, ideologi
cal Nazi racism and continued to exist barely under cover, as documented
by several public opinion surveys in the postwar period. This distinction
had several critical repercussions, as Richard Mitten has pointed out: “[It]
minimize[d] the significance of non-racial anti-Jewish hostilities, which no
longer counted as antisemitic . . . [Tjhe identification of antisemitism with
Nazism tout court implied that legitimate anti-Nazi credentials, which the
founders of the Second Republic undoubtedly possessed, made one into
an opponent of antisemitic prejudice.”"^
importance as a mediator between east and west. It would also remind the world of contem
porary Vienna’s touristic value, explicitly celebrating the city’s role as the center of a multi
ethnic, culturally vibrant Empire. The Hrdlicka monument, however, evoked a past of civil
war and fascist cruelty. It is not that anyone would deny the existence of this other past, but
rather that this past has no role in the definition of the present. In the end, of course, imper
ial tradition prevailed, and Empress Zita passed by the Hrdlicka monument.
4. Richard Mitten, The Politics of Antisemitic Prejudice: The Waldheim Phenomenon in
Austria (Boulder, 1992), 31.
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The new post-1945 Austrian identity did, however, take the legacy of
the recent interwar period self-consciously into account in one important
way. The political leaders of the new Austria were determined to minimize
the kind of social and political polarization that had paralyzed the First
Republic and produced civil war. In the social partnership system set up in
1957, they devised a way to divide social and economic power proportion
ately, not only among political parties, but also among the unions, cham
bers of commerce, and representatives of industry whom the parties
directly represent. This system, known as Proporz, worked to smooth over
all potential conflicts between labor and capital and created an enviable
social stability in the Second Republic. While it resembled comparable
neocorporatist arrangements in Western Europe, the influence of Proporz,
as we will see, extended much further into the public sphere than in most
other societies.
As the Cold War receded, as traditional taboos faded, and, most
importantly, as Austrians themselves began to explore their twentieth-cen
tury histories more fully, questions emerged that undermined the tradi
tionally shared assumptions of public life since 1945. The controversy sur
rounding the 1986 election of Kurt Waldheim to the Austrian presidency
was only the most obvious example of ongoing dissonance between public
consensus and private memory. The typical answers Waldheim provided
to emerging questions about his peace- and wartime records during the
Anschluss years suddenly no longer sufficed to remove those subjects from
public discussion, as they might have in the past. Another such dissonance
erupted from public confrontation with the traveling exhibition “Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941 bis 1944” in 1995-98. The
exhibition documented in photographs the participation of ordinary Ger
man soldiers in atrocities on the Eastern Front. It challenged the ways in
which thousands of ordinary Austrians had interpreted their personal
experiences of war. In doing so it suggested an unsettling newer history
that both confirmed individual memory and disputed the traditional pub
lic constructions that had up until now been used to interpret those mem
ories. Ruth Beckerman’s film Jenseits des Krieges, for example, captures
this dissonance superbly. Her interviews with Austrian veterans at the
exhibition show how similar memories can produce clashing interpreta
tions between those who seek to justify the atrocities and those who can
find no justification for them.
Austrian public life in the past decade seems littered with incidents
that confront Austrians with events for which they have only recently
begun to acknowledge some personal responsibility. These incidents
demand more than an admission of complicity, for they challenge the very
founding myths of modern Austrian identity. Incidents like the Waldheim
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affair, confrontations like those surrounding the Wehrmacht exhibition,
and, potentially, arguments in the Goldhagen book all point to a chasm
between personal, lived memory and public national identity. They also
make public a strong undercurrent of continuity between pre- and post1945 ways of thinking about the world that precisely the public repudia
tion of Nazi antisemitism after 1945, mentioned above, failed to address.
Several scholars have shown convincingly that Austrians often defended
Waldheim in 1986 using cultural tropes that strongly evoked antisemitism,
even as Waldheim’s defenders publicly repudiated antisemitism. In the same
way, critics of the “Crimes of the Wehrmacht” exhibition imagined an
external conspiracy was responsible for denigrating the largely honorable
men who had fought to defend their country (Grossdeutschland), while at
the same time they deplored the fact that certain atrocities had taken
place.^
The Austrian System in Trouble

Without a brief explication of Austria’s recent political history, incidents
like the Waldheim affair, the Wehrmacht exhibition controversy, or even
the public response to Hitler’s Willing Executioners appear to confirm that
society’s long tradition of hiding behind its status as Hitler’s first victim.
Yet this interpretation, popular in the West, misses several developments
of the past two decades that also help to account for Jorg Haider’s mete
oric rise. In Austria one cannot speak of a public sphere, or public debate,
without invoking the political parties that dominate that sphere so com
pletely. In Austria there is very little public space for any opinion that is
not in some way connected to the parties. This is partly a result of Proporz,
the attempt to avoid the social polarization of the 1930s by giving each of
the major parties, the SPO and the OVP, some official role in almost every
public institution, either through appointments or funding. Appointments
to university positions largely depend on party relations within those insti
tutions, and institutional research agendas reflect to a large extent party
agendas. The extent of government-funded activity in Austrian society
(from banks to unions to chambers of commerce to Austria’s newspapers)
guarantees that particular debates will conform to party political ideolog
ical positions. Even Austria’s relatively independent newspapers of record.
Standard and Die Presse, are forced to engage in discussions whose para
meters are often set by the party press.
In 1996 Austrian society enjoyed relative economic prosperity by gen5. See the excellent examples cited by Mitten in his Politics of Antisemitic Prejudice.
chapter 8, “The Campaign against Waldheim and the Emergence of the Feindbild,” 198-245.
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eral European standards, yet it suffered from an escalating cultural polar
ization. As the government moved to fulfill the budget-balancing require
ments for adopting the euro, anxiety over job security grew. Since 1989
many Austrians feared the dual specter of (1) cheap labor in the formerly
communist neighboring states, and (2) a potential influx of southern and
eastern European immigrants fleeing war in the former Yugoslavia. Aus
tria alone, it was believed, would have to bear the burden of opportunist
immigrants from the East and face the perceived security challenges that
would accompany this immigration, while cutting subsidies to stateowned industries and welfare benefits to Austrian citizens. Polls taken in
1995 showed that a third of Austrians believed that guest workers and
other foreigners living in Austria already had too many benefits.^ Enthusi
asm for the European Union was also on the wane, particularly given the
possibility of its eastward expansion and people’s fears that this develop
ment would negatively impact Austrian employment.
Since 1986 Austria has been governed by a so-called great coalition of
SPO and OVP, with the socialists as senior partner. During those years,
however, the vote totals for both major parties have fallen drastically, par
ticularly in the case of the OVP, which by 1992 was garnering only 27 per
cent of the vote at the federal level. The main beneficiary of this decline
was Austria’s Freedom Party (FPO). The spectacular rise of the FPO and
its charismatic leader Jorg Haider is the major phenomenon of Austrian
politics in the past fifteen years. Originally a minor third party with single
digit popular support at the federal level, the FPO traditionally gathered
an odd collection of German nationalists, anticlericals, small businessmen
excluded from Proporz, and economic liberals who opposed the corporatist Proporz system. In the 1970s the FPO appeared at least superficially
to be developing into Austria’s counterpart to Germany’s Free Democra
tic Party (FDP). And indeed, from 1983 until 1986, under Norbert Steger
and its liberal wing, the party joined the SPO in a social-liberal governing
coalition. A stunning coup executed by Haider and his nationalist allies in
1986, however, ejected Steger and the liberal wing from prominence and
took the FPO out of the government and into opposition.
Ideologically the party moved sharply to the right; its program
became synonymous with Haider’s own positions, themselves a mixture of
populist opportunism and German nationalist tradition. And Haider’s
stunning electoral successes only strengthened his power to dictate policy
6. Tony Judt, “Austria and the Ghost of the New Europe,” reprinted in Contemporary
Austrian Studies 6 (1998): 126-37; Richard Mitten, “Jorg Haider, the Anti-immigrant Peti
tion, and Immigration Policy in Austria,” Patterns of Prejudice 28 (April 1994): Ti-Al. Sub
sequent poll data in 1999 show the number has risen to around half of all Austrians, with
even higher numbers among older Austrians.
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within the party.’ The FPO took advantage of several realignments among
Austrian voters that the two major parties ignored. Its popularity grew
despite the fact that in 1993, the remaining social liberals abandoned the
FPO to form their own party under Fleide Schmidt, the progressive Lib
erates Forum (LiF). By this time, however, Haider had managed to make
the FPO into a strong, populist, catch-all party of opposition to the status
quo in Austria, attracting first the votes of conservatives dissatisfied with
the 6VP and later, increasingly, the votes of workers dissatisfied with the
SPO.^
Far more important to Haider’s rise than his German nationalist con
nections and his implicitly revisionist view of the Third Reich, however,
was his strongly xenophobic stance on immigration during a period of eco
nomic restructuring and social uncertainty.^ Linking rising urban crime to
the increase in immigrants and a crisis in the welfare system, Haider
pushed a referendum to tighten Austria’s immigration laws and to force
immigrants to work. He vigorously opposed membership in the European
Union, and although he lost that particular battle, he soon benefited from
the growing perception after Austria’s entrance that the drawbacks to the
Union in fact outweighed the advantages. In the past four years Haider
has even downplayed his explicit German nationalism (much to the disap
pointment of his original supporters) for an Austrian nationalism
grounded in the sacred notion of Heimat that conjures German national
ist images less directly but more effectively. The FPO juxtaposes the ideal
of Heimat to the perceived negative results of cultural pluralism, especially
the growing threat of urban crime and welfare cheating. A 1998 FPO
poster in Vienna trumpeted the words “Heimat, Sicherheit, Arbeit,” and
more explicitly, “Our Heimat should remain OUR Heimat. ”
Haider’s successes need further contextualization, however. It is often
forgotten that his is only the most successful, but certainly not the only,
7. Under Haider the FPO raised its federal election vote total in 1986 to 9.7 percent. In
the 1990 elections it received 16.6 percent, while in 1994 it gained almost one-quarter of the
votes cast. In 1995 the FPO vote total fell slightly, to 21.9 percent, but in the 1996 elections
to the European Parliament (with no concrete repercussions for Austrian internal policy), the
FPO gained 27.6 percent. Recently, in the parliamentary elections of October 1999, the FPO
became Austria’s second largest party for the first time. In some of the federal states, the FPO
regularly receives at least a third of all votes in local elections. In the 1999 elections in
Carinthia the FPO gained 40 percent, enabling Haider to assume the governorship.
8. In 1983 some 2 percent of Austrian workers voted for the FPO, while 70 percent
voted for the SPO. In the elections to the European Parliament of 1996, however, each of the
two parties received about 40 percent of the working-class vote. See Reinhold Gartner, “Sur
vey of Austrian Politics, 1996,” Contemporary Austrian Studies 6 (1997): 303.
9. For stunning examples of Haider’s statements on the Third Reich, and for his rhetor
ical uses of the immigration and welfare issues, see Hans-Henning Scharsach, Haiders Kampf
(Vienna, 1992), particularly chapters 5 and 8.
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new party capitalizing on general popular frustration with the Austrian
status quo. Austrians on both the left and right of the political spectrum
are currently demanding a more democratized, less bureaucratized politi
cal culture. To the new parties on the left that entered parliament during
this period, the Greens and the LiF, less bureaucracy means more social
and cultural pluralism, more basis Demokratie, less Proporz. For the
Haider right, less bureaucracy means less red tape for business, less “wel
fare corruption,” fewer union-boss privileges, as well as an end to Proporz.
Up until 1995, Haider’s successes in Austrian politics came mainly at
the expense of the conservative Catholic OVP. Struggling to present a
coherent alternative to the socialists, the OVP was nonetheless implicated
by its presence in the coalition and its historic responsibility for the Pro
porz system. Seeking to reverse his party’s freefall, OVP leader Wolfgang
Schiissel precipitated a crisis in 1995 by calling for new elections. These,
he hoped, would be won by an OVP that would present a dramatic
Thatcherite conservative alternative to socialist policies. Implicitly, how
ever, this strategy relied on the idea of an OVP-FPO coalition, since by
itself the OVP was unlikely to gain more than a plurality of votes. In fact,
most Austrian voters opposed this option, fearing it would bring economic
instability. Schiissel’s decision backfired, and while the SPO actually
increased its vote total to 38 percent, the OVP with 28 percent remained
only just ahead of the FPO with 22 percent.The coalition was renewed,
but in the shadow of a fast-growing FPO.
The political jockeying among the parties has been played out
increasingly in the realm of cultural politics. Haider has all along been a
master at exploiting cultural issues and social fears around immigration,
antisemitism, and security. Constrained by coalition economic policies
that bind it to the SPO, the OVP too has turned increasingly to the realm
of culture and identity to give itself a recognizably differentiated identity.
Church, family, and order are its stock-in-trade, along with subtle appeals
to a rural nationalism against the cultural immorality of Vienna. Here the
powerful influence of parties in the Austrian public sphere is clear. For if
the OVP had not viewed the election of Kurt Waldheim as a crucial oppor
tunity for it to regain power from the SPO in 1986, for example, the pub
lic debate, the coded antisemitic attacks on Waldheim’s doubters, and the
general defensiveness against outsiders attempting to control Austria
would have been far less audible. Without the party (and party press)
interest in giving it a specific construction, the Waldheim controversy
could not have become a major public issue.
10. If one adds together the totals for the nongovernmental parties (FPO, Greens, LiF),
it becomes clear just how much voter attrition has decimated the power bases of the two
major parties in the past two decades. Over a third of Austrians now vote for other parties.
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Since 1986 and the breakdown of the victim consensus, all the parties
appear implicitly to be debating the question of a useful and coherent Aus
trian national identity. The debate mobilizes three distinct points of view.
The OVP still defends a modified version of the traditional “victim” thesis
against the newer “perpetrator” allegations of the SPO, Greens, and LiF.
In his ten years in office, SPO Chancellor Franz Vranitzky was far more
outspoken than any of his predecessors in acknowledging the damaging
legacy of Catholic antisemitism to Austria, both past and present. In doing
so, he abandoned the original myth that had enabled the SPO and OVP to
find common ground since 1945. During Vranitzky’s tenure, and after
long debate in 1995, the government finally sef up a National Fund for the
Victims of National Socialism.Other politicians on the left, notably in
the Green and LiF parties, expressed outrage about Austria’s hidden per
petrator past. In 1997, after viewing the “Crimes of the Wehrmacht” exhi
bition, Heide Schmidt, leader of LiF, spoke publicly about her past “blind
spot” regarding antisemitism and Austrian participation in the Holo
caust.'^ Haider’s growing success points to yet another manipulation of
the debate. He deals neither in perpetrators nor victims, but rather defends
the national honor of patriotic German Austrians who fought in the
Wehrmacht and the SS from the accusations of so-called communist sym
pathizer historians.'^
The elections to the European Parliament in the fall of 1996 offered
activists a particularly fertile context to pursue their cultural agendas.
Haider treated this election as the moment of his possible breakthrough
(“Wahltag ist Zahltag!” proclaimed a determined Haider on several cam
paign posters). The OVP and FPO fought to outflank each other, both for
votes on the far right and now, as we will see, for the political center. As in
the Waldheim years, history once again became an explicit battleground
for struggles over Austrian identity.
The predictable gesturing to victim, perpetrator, or hero status of
Greater German Austrians swiftly acquired new significance in the public
mind due to a deft eoup executed by Haider in the 1996 campaign. The
Austrian media rightly treated Haider as the most interesting and perhaps
the most important figure on the Austrian political landscape, and in Sep
tember of 1996, Haider did not disappoint. With an enthusiastic Peter
11. This fund is smaller than many critics would have liked, and its use is limited. Sev
eral critics on the Left believed that the creation of the fund was far too little, too late, and
that Vranitzky has not really earned the reputation he enjoyed as the man who had forced
Austrians to face their history more honestly. Goldhagen und Osterreich, 17-18.
12. Christa Zoechling, ‘“Mein blinder Fleck’: Interview: Fleide Schmidt liber die Priisidentschaft und ihren Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit ihrer Eltern,” Profil 52/53 (20
December 1997): 25-26.
13. Scharsach, Haiders Kampf 125.
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Sichrowsky at his side, Haider announced that the Jewish journalist and
expatriate Sichrowsky, of all people, would lead the FPO’s list in the
upcoming elections to the European Parliament. This particular coup
scrambled the terrain of Austrian politics further, and it unleashed a storm
of controversy within an already divided Austrian Jewish community. Not
that this move by Sichrowsky and Haider was entirely unpredictable—
Sichrowsky has a record of creating controversy, given his role in the
Ignatz Bubis biography and his relatively cordial views toward Waldheim.
This alliance, however, immediately provoked the use of terms not fre
quently seen in the Austrian press, like Hofjude and Alibijude.
The heightened controversy surrounding the simultaneous opening of
the exhibition “Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941 bis
1944” in Klagenfurt a week later should be seen in this context. If Haider
was going to make a play for the political center, neutralizing accusations
of antisemitic crypto-fascism by displaying his Jewish credentials, the
OVP, not to be outdone, would bid more openly for the crypto-fascist
nationalist vote. Thus Bishop Egon Kapellari of Klagenfurt and the OVP
governor of Carinthia, Christoff Zernatto, publicly declined to patronize
or even attend the exhibit. In an interview, the governor rejected the
“right-wing extremist cliches” with which Carinthia has been saddled. (In
Carinthia, home of Jorg Haider, the FPO traditionally garners more of the
vote than at the federal level.) The leader of the SPO in Carinthia opened
the exhibition and claimed that while the majority of Carinthians have
nothing to do with right-wing extremism, Nazi chauvinism, and heroizing
of the war, still one could not forget that under the Nazi regime Austrians
were not simply victims.’'* Interestingly enough, a year before in Vienna
the exhibition had been sponsored and praised by politicians from both
OVP and SPO; only when it left for the provinces did it become an object
of political controversy.
The decision of the Vienna FPO to retain its racist election slogan,
“Wien darf nicht Chicago werden,” despite the fact that its federal list was
now headed by Sichrowsky, a Chicagoan; the studied lack of concern dis
played by FPO leaders for new evidence that linked the accused desecrators of graves at a Jewish cemetery in Eisenstadt to the FPO’s Bundesgeschdftsfiihrer Karl Schweitzer (and the FPO youth organization); and,
finally, the academic travails of the OVP candidate, the perennial wouldbe-Ph.D. Karl von Habsburg, all added to a politically polarized environ
ment. Finally, the appearance of a runaway bestseller on Hitler and anti
semitism raised the stakes of the debate further, forcing another open
discussion of Austrian antisemitism on the public. The bestseller that
14. Profil 38 (16 September 1996); 34; Die Presse, 6 September 1996, 7.
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unintentionally helped stoke the flames of Austria’s political fires received
enormous press coverage. Its author was repeatedly interviewed, and its
thesis (particularly its emphasis on a culture of popular and Catholic anti
semitism) was the subject of much public outcry. However, the book that
gained so much attention was not Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Will
ing Executioners. It was instead Brigitte Hamann’s Hitlers Wien: Lehrjahre eines Diktators.
At precisely this moment, late August 1996, the German translation
of Goldhagen’s book did indeed appear in Austrian bookstores. Its
appearance was reported in the media, and the controversy it had
unleashed in Germany and the United States duly described. The book
was reviewed relatively positively, and editorials appeared on the scholarly
aspects of the controversy the book had provoked in Germany and the
United States. The book could be found on several journalists’ “best pick”
lists of the season, but it did not unleash much of a public discussion in
Austria, either among historians, in the media, among opportunistic
politicians, or generally at large.
Goldhagen and the Austrians

The word Austria appears only once in the index of Hitler’s Willing Exe
cutioners, referring to descriptions of how Austrians brutally forced Jews
to wash the streets of Vienna after the Anschluss in March 1938. “The Aus
trians’ hearty celebrations included immediate symbolic acts of revenge
upon the Jews, who in Austria, no less than in Germany, were believed to
have exploited and injured the larger society.”'^ In subsequent interviews,
Goldhagen has stated that he treated the Austrians as part of the greater
German people and therefore did not single them out in the book. In a
September 1996 interview with Goldhagen, the Austrian newsweekly
Profil asked him, with little success, to elaborate his views of the Austrians
and their particular responsibility for the destruction of the Jews. Gold
hagen maintained that because he considered the Austrians to be exactly
the same as the Germans, just as enthusiastic and convinced about the
destruction of the Jews, there was no need to single them out.
The Profil interviewers then asked about the higher percent participa15. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the
Holocaust (New York, 1996), 286-87, 605. There are no index entries for Vienna, Karl
Lueger, Karl Iro, or Georg von Schonerer, for example, although Mauthausen does appear.
The Schonerite Iro, as Hamann pointed out, made the suggestion in a speech to parliament
that Hitler may have witnessed that immigrant Gypsies have an identification number tat
tooed on their forearms. Brigitte Hamann, Hitlers Wien: Lehrjahre eines Diktators (Munich,
1996), 191.

